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Abstract
We consider a class of signalling problems in which the informed player, after sending a
message, performs so~ne further action simultaneously with the uninformed player's response.
Two extensive-Corm games of this signalling problem are considered. First, the infotmed player
can commit to his subsequent action at the tíme of signalling. Second, the informed player's
announcement for his action is not binding at the time of performance. We show that com-
mitment ability by the informed player with tespect to his subsequent action leads to greater
communication: In the case of commitment, the informed player may completely reveal his pri-
vate information, whereas if commitment is not possible, no private information can be signalled
by the informed player.
As an example, we focus on a principal-agent relationship in which the principal can monitor
the agent's action at a fixed cost. Monitoring cost is private information of the principal.
Based on this information, he oflers a compensation scheme and announces a monitoring policy.
Monitoring is assumed to take place simultaneously with the agent's choice of an action.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In thia paper we examine the qualitative impact of commitment on the amount of infor-
mation tranamitted in equilibrium. The problem is studied in a class of signalling problems in
which the informed player, after sending a message, performs some futther action simultane-
ously with the uninformed player's teeponse. We ahow that commitment ability by the informed
player with respect to his subsequent action may lead to greater communication. In particular,
we show that under certain assumptions, the informed player may completely reveal his private
information if commitment is possible, whereas ifcommitment to his subsequent action is impos-
sible, no information is transmitted in equilibrium. The basic intution behind this result is that
the lack of commitment fot the informed player is accompanied with an incentive compatibility
constraint that excludes signalling his private information in equilibrium.
As an example, we study a principal-agent relationship in which the principal can monitor
the agent's choice of an action at a fixed cost. Here, the principal is the informed player
and the agent ia the uninformed player. Before contracting stazts, the principal learns his
monitoring cost. This cost determines his type. Based on this information, the principal offers
a compensation scheme which specifies the payment to the agent and the principal's monitoring
policy. After agreeing to contracting, the agent takes an action which is not directly observable
for the principal. Simultaneously with the agent's choice of an action, the principal can monitor
the agent's behavior. Monitoring is assumed to be observable and verifiable. The outcome,
as the tesult of the agent's action, is assumed to be observable but not verifiable. Hence, the
compensation scheme fixea the payment to the agent conditional on the principal's monitoring
choice and the agent's action.
Suppose that the principal can commit to his monitoring decision at the time of contracting.
Since the principal is obliged to perform his monitoring as announced, the agent can base his
choice of an action on the compensation scheme and the principal's monitoring announcement.
The standard theory ofsignalling games (see e.g. Banks~Sobel [1987], Cho~Kreps [1987]) would
suggest that in equilibrium principals with different monitoting cost would signal their private
information by means of different compensation schemes and monitoring policies. In fact, after
the agent agreed to contracting, monitoring cost has no further influence on his expected utility
and, hence, do not in8uence his behavior when deciding on his action. As a consequence, the
principal's choice of a compensation acheme and a monitoring policy is based only on his own
monitoring cost. Therefore, the principal signals his monitoting cost. His private information is
completely tevealed in equilibrium.
Is this conclusion changed, if we assume that the announced monitoring device is not binding
ex-post? Suppose, for example, that the principal's compensation scheme induces the agent to
choose the desired action. Since monitoring is costly, the principal can save on monitoring cost
by not monitoring. This, of course, will be foreseen by the agent. So, in general, the principal's
monitoring announcement is not credible at the time ofperformance. In this situation, sequen[ial
rationality requires the principal to artange his compensation scheme such that monitoring is
still a credible threat. In particular, monitoring is ctedible only if the principal is indifferent
regarding to this decision 1. As a result, the agent receives a premium of the amount of the3
principal's monitoring cost in case of no monitoring, in addition to his payment if the príncipal
monitors ~.
To discuss the credibility problem within the iramework of the signalling problem, note
that if the ptincipal cannot commit to his monitoring policy at the time of contracting, only the
compensation scheme can serve to signal his monitoring cost. A credible announcement of his
monitorinQ activities is not possible.
The consequences of the lack of commitment are best demonstrated in the case in which
there are just two cost types, cr and cz, with cr G c2. Suppose that a principal with cost c;
would signal his private information and offer a compensation scheme C;, i- 1, 2. with Cl ~ Cz.
Then both types ofprincipal have an incentive to exploit their information advantage at the tíme
of monitoring. To see this, consíder a príncipal with high cost c2 who offers the compensation
scheme Ct. Because the principal with cost cr pays the agent a premium cr in the case of no
monitoring, the principal with cost cZ would never monitor the agent, for the premium cr is
lower than his monitoring cost cZ. As a result, a principal with high cost prefers to offer Cr
instead of CZ. Similazly, if a principal with low cost ci ofters the compensation scheme Cs, he
would monitor with certainty, for his monitoring cost is lower than the additional payment cz
in the case of no monitoting. Hence, he can increase his profit by offering Cz instead of Cr.
Thus, each type of principal would have an incentive to imitate the other. Of course, at least in
equilibrium, the agent will anticipate this behavior by a ptincipal. In fact, the analysis shows
that the lack of commitment implies that a principal with privately known monitoring cost
cannot signal his information in equilibrium. Hence, principals with different monitoring costs
will offer an identical compensation scheme.
In the game theoretic Iiterature on auditing and tax evasion, the value of commitment by
the auditor with respect to his auditing policy is analysed by Reinganum~Wilde [1985], [1986].
However, these authots do not study private information by the auditor. The role of private
information of the principal prior to contracting with the agent is studied in Myerson [1983]
and Maskin~Tirole [1990], [1992] 3. The lack of commitment, however, is not considered in
this literature. Imperfect commitment by the principal is emphasized in the articles by Laffont
and Tirole [1988] and Fudenberg and Tiro]e [I990] 4; these suthors do not focus on asymmetric
information at the time of contracting.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we desctibe the basic principal-agent model
in which the principal has the possibilíty to monitor the agent's choice of an action at some fixed
cost. In this section, the principal's monitoring cost are assumed to be common knowledge.
Section 3 introduces the aspect of private information by the principal with respect to his
monitoring cost. In Section 4 we extend the basic principal-agent model in several directions.
Section 5 generalizes our results to a class of signalling problems.4
2. MONITORSNG IN A PRINCIPAL-AGENT R.ELATIONSHIP
In otder to concentrate on the essential features ot the commitment problem, we study a
very aimple model ofa principa!-agent relationship. A principal ofters a compensation acheme to
an agent for ajoint venture. Under this arrangement, the agent ia to take an action a' E A. For
simplicity, we asaume that the agent's action set is A-{ay, aX}. That is, the agent can either
decide to work hard and choose the action aH, or he decides to be lazy and choosea the action
ay (see Section 4 fot the case of a continuum of actions). His action a determinea an outcome
B(a) which we will take to be the principal's gross profit. B(a) is assumed to be observable
but not verifiable (see e.g. Hart~Moore (1988J). Hence, the agent's payment cannot depend
on the outcome. The agent'a action ia not directly observable by the principal. However, the
principal can monitor the agent's deciaion at a cost c 1 0. Monitoring reveals the agent's action
completely.
The compensation scheme fixea the agent's payment conditional on the principal's monitor-
ing choice and the action taken by the ngent. If no monitoring takes place, the agent's payment
cannot depend on his action. Hence, one can think of a compensation scheme as a function C:
C: A x {mo, nomo} -. [j, oo) such that
C(a, mo) - J(a) for a E A,
C(a, nomo) - J independent of a E A.
C(a, mo) is interpreted as the agent'a payment, if the principal monitors his decision; C(a, nomo)
denotes the agent's payment in a situation in which no monitoring takes place.
The principal is assumed to be riak neutral. He is interested in net profit, that is, he
maximizes gross profit minua the payment to the agent minus his cost for monitoring.
The agent has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ZI(a, I) which depends on the
action a he chooses and the payment I. For simplicity, we assume U(a, I) - V(I) -~C(a), where
V(I) denotes the agent's uti6ty ftom income I and IC(a) denotes his disutility from taking action
a. Fotmally, we asaume that V(.) is a real-valued, concave, continuous and sttictly increasing
function defined on (j, oo) and K(.) is a real-valued ïunction, ~C(at) C ~C(ay).
Let 1! denote the agent'e reservation utility, i.e., his expected level of utility he can achieve
by working elsewhere. To ensure that the principal can lower the agent's expected utility to his
reservation utility, we assume that Z!(ay, j) C LI. Aforeover, we assume that CI(ay, I) ~ -oo.
Thus, the agent cannot be penalized by an infinitely large fine.
Consider the ptincipal's problem i[ he wishes to implement an action a E A. He then has
to find a compensation scheme and a monitoring policy which minimizes the expected cost of
getting the agent to choose this action. Note that if the principal wishes to implement the action
aL, he should pay the agent a constant payment without monitoring the agent's behavior. This
yields optimal risk shating, as the agent ia risk averse and the principal is risk neutral. Therefote,
the ptincipal's problem is ofinterest only ifhe wishes to implement the action ay. Consequently,5
we assume in the following that the principal's profit is higher, if the agent chooses ay instead
of at.
2.7 TAe case of commitmeni:
Assume that the principal can commit to his monitoringdecision at the time ofcontracting.
Let p E[0, 1] denote his monitoring probability. If he monitore the agent, he will penalize him
for any deviation from aH. Since the agent's incentives to choose ay are the larger the larger the
penalty for a deviation, it is optimal for the principal to punish the agent as much as possible
for any non-complying behavior. Using the principle of maximum deterrence of Bazon~Besanko
[1984], we assume, without loss of generality, that I(ay) - I. Then the principal's problem
of minimizíng his expected cost to implement action aH leads to the tollowing minimization
program (P) (with I - I(ay)): s
Choose (1, J,p) to minimize ~p(I f c) t(1 - p)J~ subject to
pV(I) t (1 -p)V(J) -~C(ay) ~ ZI (IRC)
pV(I) f (1 - p)v(J) - ~(afr) ? pv(f) f (1 - p)V(J) - ~(at) (ICA)
The first constraint (IRC) guatantees the acceptance by the agent, the second constraint
(ICA) ensures that he actually chooses the action desired by the principal.
Proposition 2.1:
For every c ~ 0 let (I'(c), J'(c),p'(c)) be the solution of the principal's minimization program
(P). Then
I'(c) 1 J'(c) and p'(c) E(0,1).
Moreover, the following properties ho1d:
8cl'(c) ~ 0, 8cJ'(c) G 0~ 8cp
(c) G 0.
Proof: see Appendix A
If the principal does not monitor the agent's behavior, he is completely uninformed about
the action the agent has taken. Hence, the amount of payment to the agent in case of no
monitoring contributes positively to the agent's utility, independent of the action he chooses.
Hence, a high payment in this case would increase his incentives not to perform the action ap.
On the other hand, it the principal rewards the agent for taking the desired action in case of
monitoring, the agent's incentives to comply with the principal's interesta are high. Hence, as
the first part of the proposition shows, the agent receives a higher payment, if monitored by the
principal, as compared to his payment, if not monitored.6
Moreover, the first part of the proposition states that it ia always optimal for the principal
not to monitor the agent's choice of an action with certainty. To see this, suppose that this
claim is false. Then the principal minimizes his implementation cost, if he pays the agent a
payment Í which is determined by the agent's reservation utility, i.e. V(Í) - LÍ ~- IC(ay). Note,
that the incentive constraint (ICA) is not binding in this case. Hence, by paying the agent Í in
case of no monitoring, the principal can reduce his implementation cost. In fact, he can save pc
as long as he chooses his monitoring probability p such that the incentive constraint (ICA) is
not violated.
The second part of the proposition follows immediately from the fact that ifmonitoring cost
c increasea, monitoring becomes more costly for the principal. To save on cost, he reduces his
monitoring probability which in turn implies a higher payment to the agent in case of monitoring.
2.E The casc oj non-commiiment:
Consider now a principal-agent relationship in which the principal's monitoring announce-
ment at the time of contracting is not binding ex-post. In this situation, the principal faces the
following problem: Suppose that the compensation scheme (I', J') and the announced moni-
toring policy p' (the solution in the case of commitment, Proposition 2.1) induces the agent to
act in his interests. Since monitoring is costly, the principal can save on cost by not monitoring
the agent. This, of course, will be foreseen by the agent so the announced monitoring policy will
be not credible. Therefore, the principal has to rearrange the compensation scheme such that
his threat to monitor becomes credible ex-post. To capture this problem, we require sequential
rationality of the monitoring policy as well as of the agent's behavior:
(1) Regardless of which compensation scheme has been offered by the principal and signed by
the agent, the principal's monitoring decision and the agent's choice of an action are such
that (1.1) the principal choosea hia monitoring to minimize his implementation cost, given
the agent's action and (1.2) the agent chooses his action to maximize his expected utility
given the monitoring decision by the principal.
(2) The agent accepts any compensation scheme if his expected utility exceeds his reservation
utility, given that he foresees the principal's behavior according to (1).
(3) The principal offers the compensation scheme which maximizes his expected profit, given
that he fotesees the agent's behavior accotding to (1) and (2).
Note, that the principal's problem, as stated in (3) differs from the problem (P) in the case
of commitment only with respect to the requirement (1). That is, the lack of commitment by
the principal with repect to his monitoring announcement is accompanied with an additional
incentive constraint. To incorporate this sequential rationality constraint into his minimization
program, suppose that the principal offers an incentive device (I, J) and that the agent complies
with his interests. The principal's expected implementation cost is then given by s7
P(I f c) f(1 - P)J.
Sequential rationality with respect to his choice of a monitoring probability p E[0, 1] requires
that the principal trades off the payment J in caseofno monitoring and the sum ofthe payment





Without loss of generality, set J- I d- c. Then the incentive constraint (ICP) holds trivially
and the principal's problem of minimizing his expected cost to implement an action ag leade to
the following program (P):
Choose (I, p) to minimize I subject to
pV(I) f(1 - p)V(I t c) -~C(aH) ?U (IRC)
PV(I) t(1- P)V(I f c) -~C(aH) ?
pV(1) t (1- p)V(I f c) -1C(ay) (ICA)
Proposition 2.2:
For every c ~ 0 let (I"(c),J"(c),p"(c)) denote a solution of the principal's minimization
program (f'). Then
1"(c) -} c- J"(c) and p"(c) E(0,1).
Moreover, the following properties hold:
8c1..(c) G 0~ BcJ..(c) 1 0~ BcP..(c) 1 0.
Proof: see Jost (1991)
Dueto the lack ofcommitment, the principal's monitoring decision is restricted by sequential
rationality. This implies that monitoring is credible only if the principal is indifferent with
respect to this decision. As a consequence, the principal pays the agent a premium equal to his
monitoring cost in the case of no monitoring. An argument similar to the one for Proposition
2.1 shows that it is optimal for the principal to monitor the agent's behavior with positive
probability less than one.
The results of the second part of the proposition differ ïrom our findings in a situation
in which the principal can commit to his monitoring policy at the time of contracting, see
Proposition 2.1. To see this, note that in the case of commitment monitoring has two effects: It
serves as a device for preventing non-compliance (a disciplinary effect) and it rewards the agent8
for complying with the principal's interests (a positive income effect). Consider now the situation
in which the principal's monitoring announcement is not binding ex-post. Sequential rationality
impliea that the principal paya the agent less payment, if he monitors his action as compared
to the agent'e payment if he does not monitor. Hence, the agent prefers not to get monitored,
regardlesa of the action he chooses. Thue, monitoring can serve as an incentive device but not
as a mechanism which rewards the agentfor complying with the prescribed action. This has the
following implicatione on the principal's strategic variables, if monitoring cost goea up. Suppose
that the principal would reduce his monitoring probability by ~p. Then the agent's expected
utility increasea by Op(V(I f c) - V(I)], if he chooses action ay. On the other hand, reducing
the monitoring ptobability by ~p increases the agent's expected utility by ~p[V(I f c) - V(I)],
if he deviates from the desired action. Note that the second change in utility is greater than
the first one. To guarantee the incentive constraint (ICA), the ptincipal has to pay the agent
a higher payment I t ~I. However, reducing the monitoring probability and increasing the
agent's payment if he gets monitored implies that the agent can expect a higher utility than his
reservation utility, if he chooses the desired action. That is, the individual rationality constraint
(IRC) is not binding. But this contradicts the fact that the principal can always reduce the
agent'e payment such that the agent can expect his reservation utility ZI. As a consequence, if
monitoring cost increases, the principal's monitoring probability increases which ín turn implies
that the agent's payment in case ofmonitoring decteases, but increases in case of no monitoring.
3. A PRIVATELY INFORMED PRINCIPAL AND THE ROLE OF COMMIT-
MENT
We now extend the basic model of Section 2 and assume that the principal has private
information regazding his monitoring coat. The cost c can take one of two values cr or cz, where
0 G et G ez. We identify the principal's type with his monitoring cost c;, i- 1, 2, and assume
that the type is dtawn according to some probability distribution over {cr, cz} that is common
knowledge. We denote with 6 E[0, 1] the probability that the principal is of type cr.
We analyze two possible extensive formv of the underlying principal-agent relationship.
First, we study a model in which the principal can commit to his monitoring decision at the
time of contratting. That is, the ptincipal's announced monitoring probabílity is binding ex-
post. Second, we consider a situation in which the principal cannot commit ex-ante to his
monitoring decision and must decide on his monitoring simultaneously with the agent's choice
of an action.9
3.1 The case of commitment:
Suppose that before contracting stazts the principal leatns that his monitoring cost is c;, i-
1, 2. Let C; be the compensation scheme he offets and let p; be the monitoring probability he
announces. We assume that the principal can commit to his monitoring decision at this stage
of the telationship. In terms of a signalling game, this model refers to the case in which the
message send by the principal consists of a compensation scheme and a monitoring policy.
Let á;(C,p) denote the agent's postetior belief that the ptincipal who offers the contract
C-(I, J) and announces the monitoting policy p has monitoring cost c;. At least in equilibrium,
the agent uses Bayes' rule to compute his posterior beliefs. Then (Ci,pi,Ci,pZ) is a petfect
Bayesian equilibriumofthe principal-agent game,if (Ci,pi, C~ , pZ) is the solution of the following
2 independent maximization ptograms:
Choose (Ii, Jl, pl, I2, Jz, pz) such that for i- 1, 2:
(li, J;,P:) maximizes B(ax) -~p(I } c;) f( 1 - P)J~ subject to
2
~áj(C,P) IPV(I) f(1 - P)V(J)~ -;C(ap) 1 U
i-1
s z
~ ói (C~ P) IPV (I) f (1 - P)V(J)~ - ~(ax) ? ~ ái (C,P) IPV(~) f (1 - P)V(J)~ - K(aL)
i-1 i-r
and beliefs ë~ are consistent with Bayes'rule.
Suppose that a compensation scheme C; is offered and a monitoring policy p; ia announced
by the principal. Then the pair (C;,p;) determines uniquely the agent's expected utility for every
decision a E A. In particular, the agent's expected utility is independent of the actual type of
the principal. That is, if the principal has announced (C;,p;), his monitoring cost has no further
influence on the agenCs expected utility and, hence, do not influence the agent's behavior in
this situation:
z
~ ói (C~,Pr) ~P;V(I;) f (1 - P;)V(Jt)~ - ~(aH) - ~P;V(I;) f ( 1 - Pt)V(Jr)~ - ~(ax)
j-1
In consequence, each type of principal decides on his decisions (C;,p;) independent of the
monitoring cost of the other type. His minimization problem when implementing the action ay
is therefore identical to the program (P) in Section 2. This implies that in equilibrium the choice
(Cj,p; ) depends only on the principal's actual monitoring cost c;. He maximizes his expected
net profit as in a relationship without adverse selection issues.
From Proposition 2.1 it then follows that any equilibrium in the case with commitment is a
separating one. According to Proposition 2.1, the pair (C; ,p;) is determined by the principal's
monitoring cost. Hecause the principal can precommit to his monitoring decision, the agentlo
chooses his action independent of his belief about the actual type of principal. Thus, a principal
with high monitoring cost cannot gain by imitating a principal with low cost, and vice versa.
Proposition 3.1:
T6e only equilibrium in the principal-agent relationship with commitment by the principal
to óismonitoring policy is a separatingone. Let (Ci ,p~) and (C~,p~) be the equilibrium strategies
of a principal with low and high monitoting cost, respectively. Then the following properties
hold:
Ii G Iz , Ji ~ Jz, pi C pi.
In equilibrium a principal with lower monitoting cost announces to monitor with a higher
probability than a principal with higher cost would do. He pays the agent more in the case he
does not monitor but less if he monitore, compared to a principal with higher monitoring cost.
3.2 The case oJ non-commifinent:
Suppose that a principal with private information about his monitoring cost cannot commit
to his monitoring policy at the time, he offers a compensation scheme. Instead, he is to decide
on his monitoring simultaneously with the agent's choice of an action. Then his monitoring
decision cannot serve as a message to signal his monitoring cost.
We analyze thia game using the concept of sequential equilibrium. In a sequential equilib-
rium, the following properties hold:
(1) Regardless of which compensation scheme C has been offered by the principal and signed
by the agent, the principal decides on his monitoring to minimize his implementation cost,
given the agent's choice of an action (1.1) and the agentselecta an action that maximizes his
expected utility, given hisposterior assessment about the principal's type and the principal's
monitoring decision (1.2). We denote with 6(C) the agent'sposterior beliefthat the principal
has monitoring cost c~. At least in equilibrium, the agent uses Bayes' rule to calculate this
belief.
(2) On the basis of hia posterior belief 6(C), the agent signs any arrangement C if his expected
utility exceeds his teservation utility, given that he foresees the principal's monitoring choice
according to (1).
(3) The principal offers a compensation scheme C' that maximizes his expected net profit as
the sum ofhie gross profit minus the implementation cost, given that he foresees the agent's
behavior according to (1) and (2).
The Iack of commitment to his monitoring desicion has important consequences on the
behavior of a principal in equilibrium.ii
Proposition 3.2:
The only equilibrium in the principal-agent relationship without commitment 6y the principal
to his monitoring policy is a pooling equilibrium of the following form. There exist values
OGViG61GDzGL~G lsuchthat
i) if 6 G 61 then
1
~'-I'fcs, Pi-1, Pi- 1-á'(ás-á),
á(C') - 6, ó(C) G vr for a11 C~ C',
ii) if 6~ 6z then
~'-1'fci,Pi- ó,Pi-O.
a(c') - á, á(c) ~ ~, for a!1 c ~ c',
iii) ifá E (ór,6z) then
the equilibrium in i) can be supported with beliefs
ó(C') - ó, 6(C) G vt for C~ C',
the equilibrium in ii) can be supported with óeGefs
á(C') - 6, á(C) ~ vz for C~ C'.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose that the claim of Proposition 3.2
is (alse and there exists an equilibrium in which a principal with cost c; offers a compensation
scheme C;, i- 1, 2, with Cr ~ Cz. Then, atter the arrangement is accepted by the agent,
the ptincipal still must decide on his monitoring behavior. The assumption that the principal
cannot commit to his monitoring at the time tonttacting puts him in the position to exploit his
information advantage. In fact, suppose that a principal with !ow monitoring cost et offers the
scheme Cz of the other type. In equilibrium, the agent believes that he is contracting with a
principal having cost cz and chooses an action, taking into actount possible monitoring by the
principal of type cz (note that under C~ monitoring is credible ex-post only if the agent receives
a premium cq when no monitoring takes place). But then the principal with cost cr prefers to
monitor the agent with certainty, for his monitoting cost ia lower than the premium cz he has to
pay in case of no monitoring. From Proposition 2.2 it then follows that the principal with cost cl
can increase profit by offering Cz instead of Cr. Similazly, a principal with high cost cz who offers
the scheme Ct can make use of his private information in the following way: He prefers not to
monitor Lhc agent, for his cost cz is higher than the premium cl. Again, according to Proposition
2.2, the arrangement Cl yields higher profit lhan Cz. Of course, in equilibrium this behavior
will be toreseen by the agent and excludes the existence of separating compensation schemes.
In fact, Proposition 3.2 states that the only equilibrium in the principal-agent relationship
without commitment is a pooling one in which principals with different monitoring costa ofier
an identical compensation scheme. O( course, different types of principal will differ in their
monitoring policies.
We discuss Ptoposition 3.2 using the following path of argumentation. Fitst, we show thatI2
there cannot exist a separating equilibrium. Second, we analyze the structure of the pooling
equilibrium. Third, we argue that there cannot exist a hybrid equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium
in which at least one type of ptincipal randomizes between offering a pooling or a sepatating
compensation scheme.
Separating cquifibria
Suppose that, as in the case of commitment, a principal with private intormation about
his monitoring cost signals his information by means of his compensation scheme. Let C; be
the compensation scheme offered by a principal with monitoring cost c;, i- 1, 2. According to
Proposition 2.2., sequential rationality requirea the principal to transfer his monitoring cost to
the agent if he does not monitor.
Fitst, considet the situation of a principal with low monitoring cost cr. If he offers the
compensation scheme Cr, his implementation cost in equilibrium is Cr(aX, mo)tcr. Suppose that
he deviatea to the artangement C~. Since the principal with cost cz is indifferent in equilibrium
between monitoring or not, a principal with lower monitoring cost prefera to monitor with
certainty, for his monitoring cost cr does not exceed the premium cz of the scheme Cz in case of
no monitoring: Cq(aX, mo) ~ ct G Cy(aX, nomo) - Cx(aX, mo) f cz. Hence, if a principal with
cost ct would deviate to Cz, his implementation cost is Cz(aX, mo) } cl.
Alternatively, consider a principal with high monitoring cost c2. If he offers the compen-
sation scheme Cz in equilibrium, hia implementation cost is Cz(aX, mo) f cz. Suppose that he
would offer the arrangement Cr. Because the principal with low monitoring cost cr is indif-
ferent in equilibrium between monitoring or not, the principal with cost c2 has no incentive
to monitor the agent's behavior at all. He gains by not paying an amount cz for monitor-
ing, but only a premium cr as an additional payment to the agent in case of no monitoring:
Cr(aX, mo) t ct - Cr(aX, nomo) G Cr(aX, mo) t cz. Hence, if a principal with monitoring cost
cz offers Cl, his implementation cost is Cr(aX, mo) f cl.
We assumed that (Ci,C2) are separating equilibrium compensation schemes. As a conse-
quence, a principal of type c; has no incentives to deviate from his equilibrium arrangement. In
particular, a principal cannot gain by offeting the equilibrium arrangement of the other type.
That is, the principal's expected net profit in equilibrium exceeds his expected profit, if he offers
the equilibtium acheme of the other type. Hence, for a principal with cost cr equilibrium requires
g(aX) -~Cl(aX,mo) f cr~ ~ B(aX) -~Cz(aX,ma) f Cl~,
i.e., C2(aX,mo) 1 Ci(aX,ma). (1)
Moreover, a principal with cost cz cannot gain in equilibrium by offering the compensation
scheme C~. Hence
g(aX) -~C2(aX,ma) ~- CY~ ~ 8(aH) -~Cl(aN,ma) f cl~,
l.e., CI(aX, m0) i C4(aX, ma) }(C4 - Cr)' (2)13
Summarizing the restrictions (1) and (2) yields c~ - c~ G 0, a contradiction.
Pooling equifibria
Suppose that both types ofprincipal offet an identical compensation scheme C to implement
the action aH. Then C does not dependent on the actual monitoting cost of the principal and
the arrangement C does not transmit any information about the principal's private intormation.
Hence, the agent's posterior assessment that he is contrazting with a principal of type ct is 6
(respectively, 1- Á for a type cz.) His expected utility, if he chooses action aN is then given es
ó IPrV(!) f(1 - Pt)V(J)J
f(1 - 6) IPsV(I) f(1 - P2)V(J)J -~(ax).
Consider now the behavior of a principal when deciding on his monitoring policy. Sequential
rationality with respect to his monitoring decision requires that he tradea off the payment to
the agent in case of no monitoring and the sum of the payment to the agent and his monitoring
cost in case he monitors. If we consider a principal with cost c; who monitors with probability
p;, his expected implementation coet is given by
P~(! f cr) f Í1 - P;)J.
Sequential rationality then imposea the following incentive constraints on the monitoring behav-
ior of a principal of type c;:
1. If J-! G cr then pl - 0, pz - 0.
2. If J- I - e~ then pt E[0, 1], p~ - 0.
3. If J-! E(ci,cz) then pr - 1, pz - 0.
4. If J- I - c2 then pr - 1, py E[0,1].
5. If J- I ~ cz then pt - 1, pz - 1.
The restríctions show that a principal with lower cast monitors the agent's behavior with a
higher probability than a principal with higher cost. That is, pt 1 pz. Moreover, if pr - 1 and
pz - 0, the agent's payment has to satisfy J - cz G I C J - ct. The principal with cost ct
monitors with certainty, so he pre(ers to choose the payment J as high as possible, for he always
pays I and J contributes positively to the agent's expected utility. Consequently, he would set
J- I f cz. The principal with monitoring cast cz, however, prefers to choose ! as high as
possible, i.e., I- J- cl, for he always pays J. Without loss of generality, we can therefore
set either I- J- ci or I- J- ca. Then the incentive constraints above hold trivially, if we
require:
either (1) pt E (0,1], p~ - 0 iï ! - J - cr, (ICPt)
or (2) pr - 1, pz E(0,1] if I- J- cz. (ICPi)14
The principal's problem of minimizing his implementation cast then splits into two programs.
Problem (Pl) corresponds to case (1) and reads as
Choase (I,pl) to minimize (I) subject to
á IPl V(I) f(1 - Pl)V(I f ct)J
~(1 - á) I V(I -F cl)J
- IC(ax) 1 LI (IRC)
ál~PiV(I)f(1-Pi )V(Itei)J
f(1-á)LLL~V(Ifcl)J -IC(ax)?
á IP1V(Z)f(1 -Pl)V(I{. cl)J Lt(1-á)IV(Itci)J
-1C(aL) (ICA)
Similarly, case (2) leads to the following program (Py):
Choose (I,p~) to minimize (I) subject to
61 V(I)J
t(1 - 6) IPzV(I) t(1 - pz)V(I ~ cz)J
- K(aH) ~ LI (IRC)
á LLL ~V(I)~
f( 1 - 6) `f PsV(I) f (1 - Ps)V(I i. c2)] -~(ax) ?
á I V(I)] f (1 - á) [PsV(1) f(1 - Ps)V(I f cz)] -~(ac) (ICA)
Now define p~ - á. pt and pz -(1 - 6) . p~ {. 6. Then pr E[0, 1] iff pl G á and pz E[0,1] iff
á G pz. In view of these definitiona, the programs (P;), i- 1, 2, simplify to:
Choose (I,p;) to minimize (I) subject to
PiV(I)-}(1 - Pt)V(I f p) - iC(ag) ? U
P;V(I)f(1 - P~)V(I t c;) - iC(afr) 7
P~V(1) f(1 - F~)V(I f c~) -~(ac)
This minimization problem is equivalent to program (P) in Section 2.2. Let ó~ :- p~ and
óz :- py be the solutions of the ptoblems (P~) and (P~), respectively. Using the second part
of Proposition 2.2, we conclude that 61 G b1 since cl C cz. Thus, the principal's minimization
problems (P~) and (P2) have the following solutions (C; ,p; ), i- 1, 2:
1. If á~ 6~ then pi - ál , pz - 0 and I'(cl) t c~ - J'(c~).
2. If á c 6z then Pi - 1~ Ps - 1 1 á-(6z - ó) and 1'(cz) f cz - J'(c2).15
The solutions of the minimization program (P~) and (Pz) seem to be candidates for perfect
Bayesian equilibria. However, it remains to show which out-of-equilibrium beliefs actually aup-
port these solutions. Consider therefore the profit B; of a principal of type c; in the case of a
solution 1. and 2., respectively:
l. If 6~ br then H~ - 8(ax) -[I'(ct) f c~1 and Hz - 8(ax) - (I'(ct) d- ct,.
2. If b G bz then IIr - B(ax) - [I'(cz) t ciJ and Ha - 8(nx) - [I'(cs) f cx].
As we know from Proposition 2.2, the agent's payment I'(c) is decreasing in monitoring cost.
Hence, a principal with low monitoring cost cr prefers to choose the solution of program (P2),
for I'(cr) ~ I'(cz). He will offer the corresponding compensation scheme Cz as long as the
agent's prior belief is smaller than óz. However, even if 6 is higher than this critical value, the
principal of type cr is better off with the scheme Cz. To see this, restrict the possible range of
monitoring probabilities in program (Pz) to pz 1 0 and let I'(cz, b) denote the solution of thc
problem, if b~ 6z. Then the solution tor pz is a corner solution, p7 - 0. Continuity of the
I'(cz,b) in b ensures that there exists a value vz ~ éz such that for all 6 E (6q,'vz]
B(ax ) - I~(c]. Á) - [t i B(nx ) - I' (h ) - er.
Hence, ifthe agent's assessment ó exceeds the critical value is, the principal with low monitoring
cost ct prefers to offer the compensation scheme Ci.
Similarly, we can consider the preterences of a principal with high monitoting cost. Pcopo-
sition 2.2 implies that the agent's payment in case of no monitoting, J'(c) f c, ia increasing in c.
So the profit of a principal of type cz with respect to the solution ofprogram (Pt) is greater than
the one with respect to the solution of program (Pz). Hence, if b~ ár, he prefers to offer the
arrangement Ci instead of Cz. According to the argument above, a principal with cost cz prefers
to offer the arrangement Cz, if the agent's assessment that he is contracting with a principal of
type ct is smaller than some critical value. That is, there exists a value vt G bt such that for
all 6 E [v1, 6~ )
Q(ax ) - I' (ct ~~t ) - ct ~ 8(ax) - I' (cs) - c2.
Ilyórid equiliórin
We conclude the discussion on the strudure of equílibria and show that there cannot exist
hybrid equilibria. Suppose, therefore, that one type of principal randomizes in equilibrium
between the compensation schemes C~ and Cz, whereas the other type chooses C; , i- 1 or 2.
Let H;(C, p;(C)) denote the net profit of a principal of type e;, if he offera the arrangement C.
Then we can distinguish two cases.
First, assume that the principal with cost ct is indifTerent between C~ and C~. Then the
following conditions have to be satisfied:16
Hr(Ci,Pi(Cí)) - Hr(ci~Pi(Ci))~
and IIz(Ci~Pi(Ci)) ~ Hz~Ci,Pi(Ci)~.
Equation (3) requires that the principal with cost cr randomizes between Ci and Cz. Equation
(4) guarantees that the principal with cost cz ptefers to offer C?. The discussion on separating
equilibria shows that if the principal with cost cz would offer the arrangement Ci, he would
never monitor the agent and his expected net profit would be
IIz~Ci,PS(Ci)Í - Hr(Ci,Pi(Ci)~-
But thia impliea that the expected net ptofit of a principal with higher monitoring cost is higher
than the one for a principal with lower cost, if both offer the same compensation scheme Ci.
However, this conttadicts the result on the payoff structure in pooling equilibria.
It remains to etudy the case in which the principal with highet monitoring cost cz randomizes
between Ci and Cz, whereas the other type chooses C~ . Then equilíbrium requires
IIz~Ci,Pi(Cí)~ - IIz~Cz,P2(Ci))~ (5)
and Hr(Ci~Pi(Ci)) ~ Tlr(Ci,Pi(Ci)~~ (6)
As we have seen before, a principal with monitoring cost cr always monitors the agent, if he
would offer the scheme C2 and his expected net profit is
Hr(Ci,Pi(Ci)) - Hz(Ci,Pz(Ci)~ f (cz -cr). (7)
Moreovet, the discussion on the payoff structure in a pooling equilibrium shows, that
IIi~Ci~Pi(Ci)~ - Hz~Ci,Pi(Ci)~~ (8)
or Hi~Ci,Pi(Ci)~ - Hz(Cí,Pi(Ci)) t(cz - ci). (9)
Again, the equationa (5) to (8), resp. (9) yield a contradiction. Hence, we conclude that there
cannot exists a hybrid equilibrium.17
4. EXTENSIONS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL
The purpose of this section is to extend the simple principal-agent game of Section 2 and
3. We argue that several of our simplifying assumptions can be relaxed without affecting the
results. First, we consider a set-up in whith there are more than two possible typea of principal
and in which the agent has a continuum of actions available. Second, we consider the case in
which the preferences of the agent depend nontrivially on the principal's monitoring cast.
Let T denote the set of principaPs types (costs) where T C ~t is assumed to be finite.
We index T- {ci,...,c„} so that c; G c;ti. Let A denote a compact and convex set of
actions available to the agent. First, consider the case in which the principal's monitoring
cost is common knowledge and in which the principal can commit to his monitoring policy
at the time of contracting. Then the principal's problem can be described as follows. Let
(a, I, J, p) E A x [I, oo) x~, oo) x[0, 1] be the set of pairs of compensation schemes (a,C) and
monitoring probabilities p such that the agent is willing to work for the principal and will find it
optimal to choose action a E A. Then the principal of type c; chooses (a; , I; , J;, pj) in order to
maximize his net benefit. Thus, the principal has to solve the following maximization program:
Choose (a, I, J,p) to maximize 8(a) -~p(1 f c;) f(1 - p)J~ subject to
pV(1) t(1 - P)V(J) - IC(a) ~ u
pV(I) t(1 - P)V(J) -~C(a) ? PV(1) f(1 - P)V(J) -1C(á) for all á E A.
This program can be solved in a standard contract theoretical framework. Let (a;, C;, pj)
denote a solution of this program. We make the following assumption
(A): Suppose that the principal's cost c; E T is common knowledge at the time of contracting
and that the principal can commit to monitoring at the time of contracting. Then we
assume that every solution of the principal's maximization ptogram depends on his
cost,i.e.
(ai~Ci~Pi)~(aj,C~,P~) torallcr,cjET.
Assumption (A) simply says that the principal's type has some influence on the solution
oï his maximization program. The next proposition shows that under assumption (A) the
inability to make commitment leads to a decrease in the amount of information transmitted in
equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1: Suppose that assumption (A) holds. If the principal's monitoring cost
is private information, the amount of information transmitted in equiliórium depends on the
principal's ability to commit to his monitoring policy. In particular,
1. if commitment is possible, the only equilibrium is a sepatating one,
2. if commitment is not possible, the only equiliórium is a pooling one.18
The proof of this proposition is along the lines of the argumentation in Section 3 and can
be found in Appendix B. Moreover, in Appendix B we characterize the structure of equilibrium
in the case of commitment, respectively non-commitment.
We finish thie aection and consider a principal-agent game in which the agent'e preferences
depend nontrivially of the príncipal's monitoring cost. Aa an example, we assume that the
principal's private information determinea how likely monitoring would be informative. A ptin-
cipal's monitoring technology is apecified as follows. If the agent chooses an action a and the
ptincipal monitors, his observed information can take two values: {a, 0}, where 0 denotes ob-
servation "nothing". Let p E(0, 1) denote the quality of the principal's monitoring technology,
that ia, with probability p the principal's observation is informative. Let c~ 0 denote the cost
of monitoring.
In the case in which the principal's monitoring technology is common knowledge and com-
mitment to monitoring at the time of contracting is not poesible, the principal has to solve the
following minimization program, iï he wishes to implement action ay:
Choose (I, J, p) to minimize p~p(I f c) ~- (I - e)(J -} c)~ ~(1 - p)J subject to
Plev(I) t(I - B)v(J) f(I - P)v(J) -~(aX) i u
p[ev(I) f (I - P)v(J) f (I - P)v(J) - ~(a,r) ?
PIQV(1) t(1 - Q)v(J) f(I - P)V(J) -~C(aL)
and p~J - I~ - c
Set p- pp and c- c~Q. Then the ptincipal's problem is identical to the ptoblem in Section
2.2 with the additional conatraint p G q. Using the results in Section 2 and 3 we can then prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2: If the principal's private information determines how likely his monitoring
is informative but commitment to monitoring is not possióJe at the time of contracting, the
principal dces not transmit his information in equilibrium.
Proof: See Appendix C.
5. A MORE GENERAL CLASS OF SIGNALLING PROBLEMS
So far we discussed the role ofcommitment in the context of a principal-agent relationship
with a privately informed principal. The analysis of the preceding sections shows that the
infotmational value of the principal's monetary incentive scheme oftered to the agent depends
on his ability to commit to monitoring. The intention of this section is to extend this result to
a mote general class of signalling problems. In particular, we will examine general conditions
under which the inability by an informed playet to commit to his announcement for an action,19
he pertorms simultaneously with the uninformed player's tesponse, leads to a decrease in the
amount of information transmitted in equilibrium.
We consider the following class of signalling problems between an informed player, called
the principal and an uninformed player, called the agent. The principal, having observed some
private information, his type, sends a message, called a contract, to the agent. A contract
specifies an action to be taken by the principal and a transfer payment from the principal to
the agent for each pair of actions taken by the two parties. The agent then decides whether to
accept or reject the contract. If he rejects, he receives some exogenously specified reservation
utility. If he accepts the contract, both players simultaneously choose an action. We establish
the [ollowing notations and assumptions:
T: a finite set of types for the principal, T- {t~, .. . , t„} so that t; G t;}t for i - 1, ... , n- 1.
It is convenient to treat different types of the principal aa different players.
6: prior probabilitiea over the principal's types, i.e. b-(6i,...,6„) E[0,1]" such that
~~~d;-1.
A: the set of actions available to the agent when choosing his action. We assume that A is a
compact real interval.
B: the set of actions available to the principal. He performs an action 6 E B simultaneously
with the uninformed player's action. We assume that B is a compact real interval.
Y: the set of transfer payments from the principal to the agent. We assume that Y is a compact
realinterval.
An outcome of the game is a tuple (t, y, a, b) E T x Y x A x B. The payoffs to the principal
and to the agent are denoted ur(t, y, a, 6) and u2(t, y, a,6), respectively, when the outcome ia
(t, y, a, 6). We assume that:
ul(t, y, a, b) can be written as g(y, a) - k(t, 6), where (1) g: Y x A y fi2 is continuous, strictly
decreasing in y E Y and strictly increasing in a E A, and (2) k: T x B-. R is
non-negative and increasing in 6 E B for each t E T.
uz(t, y, a, b) is continuous and strictly increasing in y E Y and strictly decreasing and convex
in a E A for each t E T. Moreover, 8~u2~8a86 ~ 0 and 8vz~8a is a decreasing
function in the principal's type t.
The assumption that 8uz~8a is incteasing in 6 implies that a higher action 6 makes a
higher action a more desirable tor the agent. 8uz~8a decreasing in t ensures that the agent's
best response is decreasing in the principal's type: The ]ower t is, the higher the action the
agent is willing to choose (see Cho~Sobel [1990J and their assumption A3).
Let M denote the set of all functions m : Ax B-- Y which determine the transfer paymenta
from the principal to the agent conditional on their actions. m E M is called an incentive scheme.
m specifies the agent's income conditional on future observations about the players' actions. Let
a E t1(A) and ~i E t1(B) denote mixed actions fot the agent and the principal, where 0(A) and
~(B) denote the sets of probability distributions with finite support on A and B, respectively.
Then a contract offered by the principal is a tuple (m,(i). To simplify the notation, we define
for all t E T expected payoffszo
EUr(t~ m, ~, i~) - ~, ur(t~ m(a, b)~ a~ b)a(a)Q(b)~
(a,D)EAxB
EUz(t, m, a, ~) - ~ uz(t, m(a, b), a, 6)a(a)~i(b).
(a.e)EAxB
We study two cases ofthe signalling problem described above: In the first case, the principal
is able to make a commitment to his aubsequent action at the time ofcontracting; in the second
case, he is not. The following assumption about the structure of the function k(-, -) for diffetent
types of principal is crucial in what follows:
(A1) If 6 C b', 6, 6' E B, then k(t, 6') - k(t, 6) is strictly increasing in t E T.
Assumption (Al) states that if two actions b and 6' yield the same payoff to some type t of
principal, i.e. ul(t, y, a, b) - ur(t, y', a, b'), and b' is greatet than 6, then all higher types t' ~ t
prefer to take the lower action 6, for u~(t',y,a,b) ~ ur(t',íf,a,ó'). Condition (A1) is a familiaz
assumption in the standard theory of signalling games (see e.g. Cho~Sobe] [1990) and their
assumption A4) and ia related to the single-crossing condition. It ensures that for a given
transfer payment y E Y higher types are more willing to announce lower actions than lower
types of principal.
Assumption (A1) plays an important role in our analysia for the following tworeasons: First,
in the game in which the principal can committo his action b at the time of contracting - the case
of a standard signalling game -(Al) or some form ofthis condition is necessary in order to obtain
separating equilibria, as Cho~Sobel [1990) noted (see alsoMailath [1987)). Second, in the game in
which the principal's announcement for an action is not binding at the time ofperformance, (A1)
is sufïtcient in ordez to obtain pooling equilibria: It ensures (together with another assumption)
that whenevet different types of principal would offer different incentive schemes, each type of
principal would have an incentive to imitate another type (see the discussion below).
We now specify two games I't and I'~ according to the principal's ability or inability to
commit to his (mixed) action ~3 and define the corresponding equilibrium concepts. In I'1, called
the "Commitment Game" we assume that the principal can commit to his action ~i at the time
of contracting. In I'~, called the "Non-Commitment Game" we assume that the principal's
announcement for an action ~3 is not binding at the time of performance.
The game Ct then has three stages:
1. Nature chooses the principal's type t; E T with probability 6;.
2. The principal offers a contract (m,Q).
3. The agent chooses a(mixed) action a.
The strategy fot a principal of type t; E T in the three-stage game consists of a choice of an
incentive scheme m(t;) and a(mixed) action ~3(t;). The agent's strategy consista of the choice
of an action a. The agent's decision ia contingent on the principal's incentive scheme and the
action proposed, i.e. a: M x 0(B) --. ~(A). We are interested in perfect Bayesian equilibria.zi
In our framework, such an equilibrium consists of n~ 1 strategies - one for each type ofprincipal
and the agent - and beliefs ó: M x ~(B) y t,(T) for the agent about the principal's typea
such that (i) for each player his strategy maximizes hia expected utility given beliefe and the
other players'strategies; (ii) the agent's belief are derived trom Bayes'rule given the equilibrium
strategies. That is, we assume that the agent updates his prior beliefs about the principal's typea
using Bayes' rule after observing the contract proposed. An equilibrium yt then ie a mapping




and beliefa 6 -(6t, .. ., D") are consistent with Bayes' rule.
An equilibrium then must satisfy two types of conditions. First, the principal offera an
incentive scheme and an action which maximizes his expected utility, given the agent's response.
That is, (ICP~) holds. Second, the agent must work in the principal's interests, given the
contract offered. That is, the incentive compatibility consttaint (ICA) holds. We make the
following assumption (A2):
(A2) There exists a separating equilibrium in the "Commitment Game".
Although, in general, this assumption should be the result of some comprehensive analysis,
(A2) can be justified in this context for two reasons: First, in view of assumption (A1), the
existence of only separating equilibria would follow, it we would impose some form of condition
which ensures that no type of principal prefers to imitate the lowest type (see e.g. Cho~Sobel
~1990J). Second, the purpose of this section is to give general conditions which imply that infor-
mation transmission is correlated with commitment ability rather than to prove the existence
of separating equilibria for some class of signalling problems involving commitment.
Next we characterize the structure of the "Non-Commitment Game" F~ and give conditions
under which only pooling equilibria exist. The game F~ has three stages:
1. Nature chooses the principal's type t; E T with probability á;.
2. The principal offers an incentive scheme m.
3. The agent chooses a(mixed) aclion a. At the same time, the principal chooses a
(mixed) action (i.
As for the "Commitment Game" Ft, we can characterize strategies for each player in F~ and
define the concept of sequential equilibria. There are two differences to the definition above:
First, the agent when choosing his optimal action, can base his decision only on the incentive
scheme offered by the principal. That is, his action and his belief about principal's type are
a function only of the incentive scheme proposed but not of the ptincipal's (mixed) action (~.zz
Second, the principal's inability to commit to the choice of an action Q at the time ofcontracting
requires sequential rationality with respect to this decision. Hence, a sequential equilibrium for
the "Non-Commitment Game" imposes an incentive compatibility constraint on the principal's
behavior. In patticular, an equilibrium y~ then is a mapping
y~ : t~--. (m(t), ~i(t, m), a(m),6(m)~ such that fot all t E T
m(t) E arg max,,,E~yEUt(t,m,a(m),(i(t,m)), (ICPI)
aupp ~(t, m) C arg maxyEBEUI(t, m(t), a(m), 6), (ICPz)
n
supp a(m) C arg maxaEOtAI ~ 6(m)(t;) EUz(t;, m(t), a, ~(t, m)), (ICA)
t-t
and beliefs 6-(át,...,b„) are consistent in the sense of Kreps~Wilson [1982].
Of course, if an equilibrium ryl of the "Commitment Game" would satisfy the principal's
constraints (ICPz), this equilibrium would also be an equilibrium in the "Non-Commitment
Game". Hence, in order to obtain no separating equilibria in the game Ca, it is necessary
to assume that for every separating equilibrium yr at least one of the principal's incentive
constraints (ICP~) is violated. In particular, it must be the case that in every separating
equilibrium ryt at least one type ofprincipal is indifferent between choosing some action 6 or 6'.
We now give a condition under which an equilibrium y~ of the "Non-Commitment Game"
cannot be a separating one: Fix an equilibrium of t~. Following Cho~Sobel (1990], we say that
b E B is a"pooled action", if more than one type ot principal uses 6 with positive probability.
Then we can state the following result.
Proposition 5.1: Let ry~ 6e an equilibrium of the "Non-Commitment Game". If y2 has a
pooled action, then y7 cannot be separating.
Proof: See Appendix D.
Note that a pooling equilibrium in the context of the "Non-Commitment Game" refers
to a situation in which all typea of principal offer an identical incentive scheme m E M.
Hence, Proposition 5.1 does not state the canonical claim that a pooling equilibrium cannot be
separating.
The intuition of the proof of Proposition 5.1 is as follows. Let y2 be an equilibrium of
the "Non-Commitment Game" in which a principal of type t; E T offers the incentive scheme
m; - m(t;) and choosea a(mixed) action Q; -~(t;,m;). Let a; - a(m;) denote the agent's
equilibrium strategy. Then define
G;(b) - ~ 9(mi(a, b)~ a)tri(a)
aEA
for each b E aupp (3;, t; E T. Thus, G;(b) is the gross utility of a principal of type t; in
equilibrium, if he chooses action 6. For 6' ~ supp (i; define23
G;(b') - G;(b) - k(t;, 6) t k(t;, 6') for 6 E supp ~i(t; ).
G;(b') then denotes the principal's gtoss utility he must receive in order to be indifferent
between playing his equilibrium (mixed) action and some other action. Figure 1 showa the grosa
utilities G,(b), respectively Gt(b), for two types of principal t; and t„ t; G ti. In Figure 1,
G;(b;~) - Gl(b;~), i.e. the indifference curvea intersect at some point 6;! E B. Assumption (A1)
requires that the slope of a principal's indifference curve increases with his type. Moreover, the
indifference curves are upwards sloping because a higher action by a principal implies higher
cost.
Figure 1
Figure 1 provides a geometric description of the proot of Ptoposition 5.1. For suppose that
the equilibrium rya has a pooled action b E B and that the two types of principal t; and 2~ choose
6 with positive probability. Then ry~ cannot be separating. To see why, consider the following
cases: 1. Suppose that the pooled action b is smaller than b;~. But then the principal of type
t~ has an incentive to deviate from his equilibrium strategy, for he can increase his utility by
imitating type t;: he offers the incentive scheme of type t; and then choosea 6 with certainty.
2. lf the pooled action 6 is greater than the intersection point b;~, the principal of type t; can
exploit his cost advantages by offering the incentive scheme of type t~ and then choosing 6 with
probability one. 3. If the intersection point b;~ is a pooled action, then each typea of principal
is indifferent between imitating the other type or playing his equilibrium strategy.
Note, that the converse of Proposition 5.1 is not ttue. To see this, consider a pooling
equilibrium of the "Non-Commitment Game" in which all types of principal offer the same
incentive scheme m E M. Then Figure 2 provides an example in which a higher type of principal
chooses a lower action b E B than a lower type (this follows from assumption (A1)) ~.
Figure 2
Proposition 5.1 provides a simple condition that ensures the non-existence of separating
equilibria in the "Non-Commitment Game". In order to guarantee that only pooling equilibria
exist, we then have to assume that ifdifferent types ofprincipal intend to offer difierent incentive
schemes, there exists a pooled action 6 E B they choose in stage 3 of I'~. One such assumption
is the following one:
Let o(t,m,~i) be the set of best responses of the agent to the incentive scheme m E M
when he knows that the principal's type is t E T and expects the principal's (mixed) action to
be Q, i.e.
u(t, m, Q) - arg maxaEAEUx(t, rn,n, Q).
Let Q(t, m, a) be the set of best responses of the principal of type t when he ofters the
incentive scheme m and expects the agent's (mixed) action to be a, i.e.24
(i(t, m,a) - arg maxpEBEUt(t, m, a, 6).
that
Let a(t, m) and ~(t, m) be (mixed) actions of the agent and, respectively, the principal such
a(t, m) C a(t, m,~i(t, m)),
~(!,m) C Q(t, m, a(i, m)).
(A3) For at least two types of principal t;,t~ E T, there exists an action b' E B such that
the following condition is satisfied: Fot every incentive scheme m E M and action
6 E B, b~ b', there exists an incentive scheme m' E M such that for all (mixed)
actiona a(t,,, m') and a(t', m)
EUt(t', m', a(t,,, m'), 6') 1 EUr(t', m, a(t', m),6) for t' E {t;, t~}.
Assumption (A3) ensures that a principal of type t;, respectively t~, would prefer to choose
an action b' and be treated like the highest type of principal t„ rather than separate from other
types (see also Cho~Sobel [1990] and their assumption A6).
Assumption (A3) then implies that no separating equilibrium in the "Non-Commitment
Game" can exist. For suppose that this claim is false. Let ry~ be a separating equilibrium. Then
we claim that 6' ia a pooled action of y~. We atgue to a contradiction. Suppose that b' is not
a pooled action of y2. Consider a principal of type t' E{t;,t~} and let EUl(t')' denote his
utility in equilibrium y~. Suppose that at stage 1 the principal of type t' deviates by offering
the incentive scheme m' given by his equilibrium scheme m and equilibrium action Q(t', m)
and assumption (A3). Suppose that following this deviation the agent has belief p and chooses
action a(p, m'). Then we claim that a(p, m') is higher than a(t,,, m'). To see this, consider
a best response ~i(t,,,m') of type t,,. According to assumption (A1), each type of principal
t G t„ then prefers to choose the highest action 6 E supp (i(t,,, m'), given the agent's response
a(t,,, m'). Since 8uz~8a is increasing in 6 and decreasing in t, the agent's best response a(t, m')
is increasing in t. Hence, a({r, m') ~ a(t,,, m') for every probability distribution ta over T. As a
consequence, if the ptincipal of type t' offera m' and chooses the action 6', his utility is
EUr(t~~m,oíP,m)~6') ~ EUr(t~~m ~a(t~,m)~b') ~ EU~(t')`.
This contradicts the assumption that m and p(t', m) is an equilibrium strategy of the
principal of type t'. Hence, the assumption that 6' is not a pooled action oí y~ must be wrong.
By Proposition 5.1, y7 then cannot be sepatating. This, however, contradicts the assumption
that ry~ is separating.25
To see how the extention in this section relates to the analysis in previous sections, assume
that the set B of actions available to the principal is a two-point action space B -{mo, nomo}.
In the example, the agent's utility is independent of the printipal's type and monitoring induces
the agent to choose a higher action a. Then assumption (A1) is satisfied because we assumed
that c; - k(t, mo) is strictly increasing in t E T and k(t, nomo) - 0 for all t E T. Moreover,
assumption (A2) holds by the assumptions in the previous sections. Finally, assumption (A3) is
valid, for all types of principal would like to be treated like the one with the highest menitoring
cost: If they offer the contract (I"(c„), J"(c„)), they would prefer to monitor with certainty
(theír monitoring costs are lower than thepremium the principal with the highest monitoringcost
pays in case of no monitoring) and the agent's remuneration in case of monitoring is decreasing
in monitoring cost (see Propositíon 2.2).
It is important to note that the following modification of the principal-agent relationship
with monitoring options by the principal doesnot satisty the assumption (A3): Assume that
the principal's action set B is the intetval [0, 1], and let 6 E B be the probability that he
monitors the agent's choice of an action. Then 6- 0(b - 1) refers to the case of no monitoring
(respectively, monitoring with certainty). In this game, a principal can design his incentive
scheme m conditional on his monitoring probability. Hence, if (a~ ,C;,p;) is an equilibrium
strategy of a principal with private intormation on his monitoring cost c; in the commitment
case (see Section 4), this strategy is also an equilibrium strategy of the principal in the case
of non-commitment: He can simply promise the agent an infinitely high payment in case he
deviates from the action p;. Hence, he chooses p; with certainty in equlibrium, independent
of his commitment ability. Assumption (A) in Section 4 then guaranteea that a ptincipal can
reveal his private ínformation aLso in the case of non-commitment. Assumption (A3) is vio]ated
in this game, because no type of principal can benefit by imitating another type: Each type
chooses his optimal action in B with certainty. That is, thete never exists a pooled action in
equilibrium.
Footnotes
~ Note, that the principal monitors the agent with positive probability, for the agent's payment
cannot be made conditional on the outcome.
2 Or, equivalently, the principal torces the agent to pay his monitoring.
3 Myerson uses an approach which is axiomatic and co-operative game theoretic. The articles by
Maskin and Tirole consider a principal-agent relationship in which the agent's action is directly
observable by the principal. They distinguish between the cases where the principal's private
information is an argument of the agent's utility function ("common values') and those where
it is not ("private values").
4 Laffont and Tirole consider a two-period model in which the ptincipal updates the compensa-
tion scheme after observing the agent's first period performance. They assume that the principal26
cannot commit not to use this information in the second period. The article by Fudenberg and
Tirole studies a model in which the principal cannot commit to a contract that will not be
renegotiated after the agent's choice of an action and before the observation of the action's
consequences.
a We sometimee use the notation (I, J) to denote a compensation scheme C.
s Note, that the principal chooses a monitoring probability p(C) E[0, 1], if the compensation
scheme C is accepted by the agent. In the following, we sometimea abuse notation and let
p- p(C) denote the principal's monitoring probability, if it is clear from the context that C is
offered.
~ Of course, the equilibrium for the "Non-Commitment Game" illustrated in Figure 2 is an
equilibrium also in the "Commitment Game".APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Suppose p- 1. Then I is determined by the equation V(I) - LÍ f~C(aH). Now let J- I.
Then the individual rationality constraint (IRC) holds for all p E (0, 1]. Since V(I) -~C(ay) ~
V(~) - K(ar.), there exists some p E(0, 1) such that the incentive constraint (ICA) still holds.
But then the principal acn increase his profit:
II(i) -B(ari)-I-c G B(arf)-I-Pc - R(P)
Dforeover, p- 0 contradicts the individual incentive constraint (ICA). Hence, the solution
of the principal'sminimization problem (P) implies p E (0, 1).
Note, that problem (P) is the minimization ofa lineaz objective function subject to concave
constraints. If we regard v- V(I) and w- V(J) as the principal's control variables, we can
convert problem (P) into the minímization of a convex function subject to línear constraints.
Hence, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem yields necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality. In
particular, there exist a 1 0, p 1 0 such that any solution (v, w, p) of the principal's minimiza-
tion program is a solution to the following problem:
min~,w.r G :- P(h(v) f c) f(1 - P)h(w) - a~Pv f( 1 - P)w - IG(ax) - u~
- N IPv t (1 - P)w - K(aH) - P8 - (1 - P)w t ~C(at)~ ,
where h(.) - V(.)-', v- V(I). An interior solution (v,w,p) of this problem (P) then
satisfies the following conditions:
P~(a f p) - h'(v)~ - 0, (1)
(1 - P)~~ - n~(w)~ - ~, (2)
h(w) - h(v) - t - aw t (1~ -f (i)v - Irv - 0. (3)
Suppose that a- 0. Then equation (2) yields a contradiction. Hence, a 7 0. Suppose that
p- 0, then h(v) - h(w) by equation (1) and (2), thus v- w. However, equation (3) then yields
a contraction. Hence, p 1 0 and h'(v) 1 h'(w), thus I~ J. Moreover, the following conditions
have to be satisfied:
pvt(1-p)w-~C(ap)-ZÍ - 0, (4)
P~v - y~ - IC(ax) t iC(at) - ~- (5)28
In equilibríum the solution (v,w,p,a, p) is determined 6y the equationa (1)-(5). Converting
these equationa auch that (I,J) are the principal's control variables shows that the solution
(I, J, p) of problem (P) is uniquely determíned. Moreover, we óave:
8e ~ A~- g~ . B t 8c - B- 0
Bc~C
f g~.D -0
8e ~ E-f- 8e ~ F- 1
Bc~E
f Bc.C -0
-BP.H f 8c-K -0
where A - V"(I), B -(a t p)'T, C- V"(J), D- a'~, E- V(I) - V(J), F- V(I) -
V(1), C- PV'(I), H- V(J) - V(1), K-(1 - P)V'(J).
Use (4') to substitute for e in (5'). Also, one can use (3') to substitute fot e in (1') and then
use (2') to subatitute for e in (1'). Then one finds:
87 G 8J K
8c E} 8c H- C
87 8J CBH B
8c A t 8c ~ DE - E
(6')
(~')
Substituting equation (t3') in (T) for ~ or ~, resp., proves the first part of the claim of the
propasition. Substituting tbis result in equation (4') proves the remaining part.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 4.1:
We use the tollowing notation:
á: prior probabilities over the principal's monitoting coet, i.e. 6-(61,...,á") E(0, 1~" such
that ~~-~ á; - 1.
á: the agent's pasterior beliefs ó - (ál , ..., ó") E(0, 1J" over the principal's monitoring cost
after the príncipal has proposed a contract (a,C) and a monitoring probabilityp, ~~-~ á; -
1.?g
1. The case of commitment
Similar to the argumentation in Section 3.1, the agent's utility is independent of the actuaJ
type ofprincipal, given a contract (a, C) and a monitoring policy p is offered:
~ó; [pV(C(a, mo)) f (I - p)V(C(a, nomo)) - rC(a)~ -
~pV(C(a, mo)) f(1 - p)V(C(a, nomo)) - rC(a)~ for all a E A
Hence, the n independent optimization programs, one for each principal of type c; are
identical to the optimization programs in the case without private information. Assumption
(A) then implies that these programs have different solutions (a;,C;,p;). Hence, the only
equilibrium in the case ofprivate intormation is the solution (ai~Ci~Pi...-~a;,,C,;,P;,). These
strategies are supported by the following beliefs ó':
ó; (a;,C; ,p;)- 1 for all i- 1, ..., n and á; (a, C, p) E[0, 1] otherwise.
2. The case of non-commitment
First, we characterize the structure of a pooling equilibrium. Second, we prove that there
cannot exist a separating equilibrium. Third, the case ofa hybrid equilibrium is analyzed.
Suppose that in equilibrium the principal's compensation scheme dces not reveal informa-
tion about his monitoring cost. Let (a',C') denote this arrangement. Sequential rationality
requires that each type ofprincipal chooses his monitoring policy as follows:
1. If J' - I' G cr then p; - 0 for all i- 1,...,n.
2. If J' - I' - c; then pi - I ior j G i, p; E[0,1], pl - 0 fot j~ i.
3. If J' - I' E(c;,c;~t) then pi - 1, for j C i, pi - 0 for j 1 i.
4. If J' - 1' ~ c„ then pt - 1, for all i- l, ..., n.
Note that for a given action of the agent, the marginal cost of the payment I' (J') is
ínereasing (decreasing) in the principal's type: If J' - I' E(e;,c;tt) for i E {1,...,n - 1},
then a principal of type ci C c; prefers to choose the payment J' as high as possible, whereas a
principal of type ci ~ c; prefers to have I' as high as possible.
We now claim that in equilibrium one type of principal is indifferent between monitoring
or not. To see this, suppose this claim is false. Let J' - I' E(c;, c;~t) for i E{1,..., n- 1},
supported by the agent's posterior beliefs 6'. Let C; denote the arrangement (I, J) with J-I - c;
which rninimizes the agent's payment I subject to the constraints that the agent signs the
contract and chooses action a'. Then if 6'(C;) - 6, the benefit of a principal ot type t~ 1 e; is
higher when oNeringC; instead otC', a contradiction. If, on the other hand side, 6k(C;) G 6k for
sorne k E{1,...,n}, there exists an index 1 E{1,...,n}, with 6;(C;) 1 át such that a ptincipal
of type p prefers C; to C' if 1~ j or C;~r to C' if t G j, a contradiction.
Hence, if (a', C') constitutes an equilibrium, then J' - I' f c; for one i E{1, .. ., n}. Thus,
we have to solve the following optimization program for each i E{1, .. . , n}:30
Choose (a; , r; , pj) to maximize B(a) - I subject to
P;v(r) f(i - nr)v(r ~ u) -!c(a) ~ u
PiV(r) f(1 - P:)V(r f c;) - IC(a) 1
PtV(L)~(1-p;)V(r~-q)-~C(a') forallá EA,
P: E[Ot-t, ~r), where 0; - 61 -F ....} ó;.
The solution (aj, r;,p; ) of thie maximization program together with the conditions p~ - 1
for cj G q and p~ - 0 for ej 1 c; then form a sequential equilibrium. To see this, suppose
that some other compensation acheme (a,C) is olfered 6y the principal. If the agent's out-of-
equilibrium beliefs Dj are arbitrary small for aIl j E{1, ... , n}, j ~ i, these beliefs support the
arrangement (ar,Cj) in equilibrium: (a; ,Cj) is the solution of the maximization problem of a
principal witó cost c; (see Section 2.2) and a principal with cost y, y~ c; cannot gain by
offering an other scheme (a, C) (see the argumentation in Section 3.2).
As in Section 3.2, we now prove 6y contradiction that there cannot exjst a separating
equilibrium. Suppose first that there exists a separating equilibtium in which dilferent types of
principal's offer diffetent compensation schemea. Let (a;,C;) denote the scheme of a principal
with cost c;. According to the argumentat in Section 3.2, the principal's net benefit is
17:(a;,G) - B(ar) - Cr(a;,mo) - u.
Now consider a principal with cast ej who offers the artangement ot a principal with cost
c;. rf cj , c;, he would not monitor the agent's behaviour. If, on the other hand, cj G c;, he
would prefer to monitor with certainty. Hence
IIj(a;eCi) - 1
jfi(ai,C;) }(ei - Cj) OCherwÍSe
Then for every pair (e;, cj ) of types otprincipal the assumption ofa separating equilibrium
yields a contradiction.
Suppose now that a hybrid equilibrium exists in which some but not all types ofprincipal
T C T offer one single compensation scheme (a,C). Let (r, J) denote the agent's payments
under this arrangement. According to the characterization of a pooling compensation scheme,
one type ofptincipal e; E T must 6e indiftérent óetween monitoring or not, i.e. r t c; - J. But
then an argument similar to the one before yields a contradiction.
Q.E.D.31
APPENDLX C
Proof of Proposition 4.2:
Consider first thé solution of the principal's program in the case in which his quality of
monitoring n is common knowledge. If the solution of the principal's program is an interior
solution, (p'Q (c), I~'(c), JQ'(c)) has the following properties (see Proposition 2.2):
Pe~(c) - P~(c~P)~P~ IQ'(c) -
1..(c,P)~ and JQ'(c) - IQ'(c) t c~P
Moreover, if the solution of the principal's program is a corner solution with p'Q(c) - 1,
then (IQ'(c), JQ'(c)) is a solution of the principal'sprogram when commitment is possióle.
To prove the claim of the proposition, suppose first that for two monitoring qualities pt
and pz the principal's programs lead to different monitoring probabilities. Then it follows
from Proposition 3.2. that if the monitoring quality p is private information for the principal,
P E{p~, pz}, no separating nor hybrid equilibrium can exist. Suppose, alternatively, that the
principal's programs for pt and p~ result in identical monitoring probabilities. This implies
that in both cases the princípal monitors with certainty and hence, compensation schemes are
identical. Now, if the principal's monitoring quality is private information and can take either
the value pl or p2, both types of príncipal will offer the same arrangement. Hence, in equilibrium
only pooling compensation schemes are possible.
Q.E.D.
APPENDIX D
Proof of Proposition 5.1:
We argue to a contradiction. Let y~ be a separating equilibrium of the "Non-Commitment
Came" in which a principal of type t; E T offers the incentive scheme m; - m(t;) and chooses a
(mi~ed) action 13; -(i(t;, m;). Let a; - a(t;,m;) denote the agent's equilibrium strategy. Then
define
G;(6) - ~ 9(mt(a,b),a)a:(a)
aEA
(or each 6 E supp (3(t;), t; E T. Thus, G,(b) is the gross utility of a principal of type t; in
equilibrium ithe chooses action b. For 6' ~ supp (i(t;) define
G,(b') - G(b) - k(t;, 6) -~ k(t;, b') for 6 E supp ( i(t;).32
G;(6') then denotes the principal's gross utility he must receive in order to 6e inditferent
between playing his equilibrium (mixed) action and some other action.
Suppose that fot two types ofprincipal t;, tj,t; C tj there exists a critical value 6;j E B
such that G-,(6;j) - Gj(b;j). Then, by the assumption (A1) and the properties of the principal's
ca~st-function k(-,.) weinfer that
G;(b) 1 Gj(6) for all 6 C 6;j,
G;(b) C Gj(b) for all 6~ 6;j.
Tosee this, consider the case in which 6 G 6;j. Then G;(b)-k(t;,b) - G;(b;j)-k(t;,6;j) 6y
definition of the function G- ,(.), hence 6y assumption (A1) G,(6) - k(tj,ó) ~ G;(b;j) -k(tj,ó;j).
Since G;(b;j) - Gj(6;j) aod Gj(b;j) - k(tj,ó;j) - Gj(b) - k(tj,ó) by definition of Gj(-), we
conclude Cr(6) - k(ti , D) 1 Gj (b) - k(tf, 6) which proves the claim. The proof for 6~ 6;j follows
in the same way.
Now, let 6 E B be an action, óoth types of principal choose with positive probability in
equilibrium.
1. If b~ b;j, then tj benefits from imitating t;, for óis payoflis G;(b) - k(tj,ó) which is
greater than his equilibrium payoffCj(b) - k(tj,ó).
2. If6~ b;j, then Cj (b) - k(t;, 6) is greater than G; (b) - k(t;, 6) and, hence, type t; has an
incentive to imitate tj.
3. If 6 - 6;j, then botó types ofprincipal are indifferent between playing their equiJibrium
strategy and imitating the other type óecause G-,(6) - Gj(b).
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